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	<title>Comments on: On confirmation bias</title>
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	<description>(``Logbook" was taken already...)</description>
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		<title>By: Massimo</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3145</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2012 15:27:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3145</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[To answer again your comments: the case for confirmation bias is absolutely untenable, no matter how much you are willing to stretch the notion of &quot;confirmation&quot; or &quot;bias&quot;. 
If you are ideologically aligned with Ridley and therefore feel that you should mount a defence of some kind of his argument (which is ultimately against climate change, let&#039;s not kid ourselves), the best way is to provide better data, or a more convincing fit to the existing data using a different model. Trying to discredit science by building a non-existent case of confirmation bias is not the way to go, in my opinion.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To answer again your comments: the case for confirmation bias is absolutely untenable, no matter how much you are willing to stretch the notion of &#8220;confirmation&#8221; or &#8220;bias&#8221;.<br />
If you are ideologically aligned with Ridley and therefore feel that you should mount a defence of some kind of his argument (which is ultimately against climate change, let&#8217;s not kid ourselves), the best way is to provide better data, or a more convincing fit to the existing data using a different model. Trying to discredit science by building a non-existent case of confirmation bias is not the way to go, in my opinion.</p>
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		<title>By: Camilla</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3131</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Camilla]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2012 07:08:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3131</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[1)
&quot;For example, it is missing his argument why science progresses: competition.&quot;

I have quoted Ridley, so I&#039;m not sure what you mean that I excluded his argument. The point Ridley was making is that if confirmation bias exist, how can scientific progression be possible. His explaination is through the prevention of monopoly. Monopoly prevents fair competition. Here the problem is about power. If one view dominates, it will prevent other views from being valid by virtue of its authority. I disagree with this point Ridley made because he is confusing science with politics. Science is not about who has the authority, but whether the theory conform to experimental findings. Nature(experimental findings) does not play much of a role in the world of economic and politics, so power and competition plays a much greater role. We can encourage competiton as much as we want, but this will not make nature want to conform to your theory. It is not clear how the encouragement of competition will lead to scientific progression. In fact, I believe it&#039;s the collaboration amongst scientists, who work together as a team, that make science exceedingly successful at solving problems in comparison to other deciplines.

2)
&quot;Your second paragraph, by the way, inappropriately equates the words “science” and “physics”.&quot;

Ok, I did reduce the word science to physics. You caught me. Although you&#039;re commenting on a physicist&#039;s blog, so we prefer to keep the discussion within our scope of experience. However, even for sciences that are more qualitative, is there not clarity and distinctness? Will our faculty of reason fail us in those sciences?

Clarity and distinctness are qualities attributed to reason. I have borrowed this concept from the philosopher, Rene Descartes. Descartes argues that what I perceive clearly and distinctly is true. 

Suppose that you have just proved the Pythagorean theorem. Does the truth of this theorem depend on your personal bias? You can clearly and distinctly see how the pythagorean theorem is true by following your proof. Likewise, when a biologist conducts ther experiment, many of her conclusions are drawn based on logic and reasoning. She makes her conclusions only when she clearly and distinctly perceive that they&#039;re true, in the face of many experimental findings. 

So how exactly does comfirmation bias contort reason? If I don&#039;t believe in the Pythagorean theorem will my bias allow me to prove it wrong? How exactly does truth depend on me?

So why do we still make errors? Oh, I don&#039;t know God doesn&#039;t exist, and we&#039;re not perfect? On a more serious note, just because it&#039;s an error it doesn&#039;t mean that it&#039;s a confirmation bias. Science is a very complex and tricky subject, and our faculty of reason is not omnipotent. However, we&#039;re able to correct ourselves from errors. The very fact that we&#039;re able to correct ourselves shows that our reasoning isn&#039;t inherently biased and flawed. This fact is another reason why science is successful because scientists are able to correct themselves and to correct each other. 

3)
&quot;I think that his example could be interpreted as if-then modelling that happens to be skewed by confirmation bias. However, he is not very clear on this point.&quot;

If he is not clear on this point, on what grounds do you believe in his arguments? 

4) &quot; The last paragraph is quite confusing, but you did make a clear statement of what you think Ridley’s says. Unfortunately, you provide no evidence of this.&quot;

The idea of reality is a very complex issue. My goal was only to entertain Ridley&#039;s arguments, rather than solving the problems once for all.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1)<br />
&#8220;For example, it is missing his argument why science progresses: competition.&#8221;</p>
<p>I have quoted Ridley, so I&#8217;m not sure what you mean that I excluded his argument. The point Ridley was making is that if confirmation bias exist, how can scientific progression be possible. His explaination is through the prevention of monopoly. Monopoly prevents fair competition. Here the problem is about power. If one view dominates, it will prevent other views from being valid by virtue of its authority. I disagree with this point Ridley made because he is confusing science with politics. Science is not about who has the authority, but whether the theory conform to experimental findings. Nature(experimental findings) does not play much of a role in the world of economic and politics, so power and competition plays a much greater role. We can encourage competiton as much as we want, but this will not make nature want to conform to your theory. It is not clear how the encouragement of competition will lead to scientific progression. In fact, I believe it&#8217;s the collaboration amongst scientists, who work together as a team, that make science exceedingly successful at solving problems in comparison to other deciplines.</p>
<p>2)<br />
&#8220;Your second paragraph, by the way, inappropriately equates the words “science” and “physics”.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ok, I did reduce the word science to physics. You caught me. Although you&#8217;re commenting on a physicist&#8217;s blog, so we prefer to keep the discussion within our scope of experience. However, even for sciences that are more qualitative, is there not clarity and distinctness? Will our faculty of reason fail us in those sciences?</p>
<p>Clarity and distinctness are qualities attributed to reason. I have borrowed this concept from the philosopher, Rene Descartes. Descartes argues that what I perceive clearly and distinctly is true. </p>
<p>Suppose that you have just proved the Pythagorean theorem. Does the truth of this theorem depend on your personal bias? You can clearly and distinctly see how the pythagorean theorem is true by following your proof. Likewise, when a biologist conducts ther experiment, many of her conclusions are drawn based on logic and reasoning. She makes her conclusions only when she clearly and distinctly perceive that they&#8217;re true, in the face of many experimental findings. </p>
<p>So how exactly does comfirmation bias contort reason? If I don&#8217;t believe in the Pythagorean theorem will my bias allow me to prove it wrong? How exactly does truth depend on me?</p>
<p>So why do we still make errors? Oh, I don&#8217;t know God doesn&#8217;t exist, and we&#8217;re not perfect? On a more serious note, just because it&#8217;s an error it doesn&#8217;t mean that it&#8217;s a confirmation bias. Science is a very complex and tricky subject, and our faculty of reason is not omnipotent. However, we&#8217;re able to correct ourselves from errors. The very fact that we&#8217;re able to correct ourselves shows that our reasoning isn&#8217;t inherently biased and flawed. This fact is another reason why science is successful because scientists are able to correct themselves and to correct each other. </p>
<p>3)<br />
&#8220;I think that his example could be interpreted as if-then modelling that happens to be skewed by confirmation bias. However, he is not very clear on this point.&#8221;</p>
<p>If he is not clear on this point, on what grounds do you believe in his arguments? </p>
<p>4) &#8221; The last paragraph is quite confusing, but you did make a clear statement of what you think Ridley’s says. Unfortunately, you provide no evidence of this.&#8221;</p>
<p>The idea of reality is a very complex issue. My goal was only to entertain Ridley&#8217;s arguments, rather than solving the problems once for all.</p>
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		<title>By: Massimo</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3128</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2012 02:45:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3128</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;In general, data must be massaged and fitted to models, it is a rare case to have our data clear and distinct.&lt;/i&gt;

&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Excuse me ?&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
I am sorry, I try to let everyone write whatever they like and for the most part I am good at ignoring nonsense, but if I don&#039;t say something here people may think that I agree with it.
I am not sure where you got this from, much less what your research experience is, but &quot;massaging the data&quot; (in physics or any other science) is a colloquial expression that is usually utilized in reference to someone&#039;s less than transparent methodology and/or otherwise dodgy scientific practices. Me, I was taught in graduate school and have always believed (and still do) that it is the model that has to fit the data, not the other way around.  If someone tells me &quot;I had to massage the data to fit that model&quot;, unless they burst into laughter and add &quot;just kidding !&quot; shortly thereafter, I have the tendency not to believe a word that they say.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>In general, data must be massaged and fitted to models, it is a rare case to have our data clear and distinct.</i></p>
<p><b><i>Excuse me ?</i></b><br />
I am sorry, I try to let everyone write whatever they like and for the most part I am good at ignoring nonsense, but if I don&#8217;t say something here people may think that I agree with it.<br />
I am not sure where you got this from, much less what your research experience is, but &#8220;massaging the data&#8221; (in physics or any other science) is a colloquial expression that is usually utilized in reference to someone&#8217;s less than transparent methodology and/or otherwise dodgy scientific practices. Me, I was taught in graduate school and have always believed (and still do) that it is the model that has to fit the data, not the other way around.  If someone tells me &#8220;I had to massage the data to fit that model&#8221;, unless they burst into laughter and add &#8220;just kidding !&#8221; shortly thereafter, I have the tendency not to believe a word that they say.</p>
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		<title>By: confused</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3126</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[confused]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2012 01:07:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3126</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[To answer some of your questions: He pointed readers to Anthony Watts&#039; website, which contains the preprint showing Watts&#039; conclusions.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To answer some of your questions: He pointed readers to Anthony Watts&#8217; website, which contains the preprint showing Watts&#8217; conclusions.</p>
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		<title>By: confused</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3125</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[confused]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2012 00:58:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3125</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I didn&#039;t say it was a good argument. I&#039;m only saying that this more accurately portrays this aspect of his argument.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I didn&#8217;t say it was a good argument. I&#8217;m only saying that this more accurately portrays this aspect of his argument.</p>
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		<title>By: confused</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3124</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[confused]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Aug 2012 23:40:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3124</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I forgot to mention, in my last reply, that my problems are with the way people are interpreting Ridley&#039;s arguments.

@Camilla

I see no problem with the first paragraph after your leading sentence, expect that it may be incomplete. For example, it is missing his argument why science progresses: competition.

Your second paragraph, by the way, inappropriately equates the words &quot;science&quot; and &quot;physics&quot;. 

In general, data must be massaged and fitted to models, it is a rare case to have our data clear and distinct.

&quot;Unless one’s consciousness is pretty much blind…&quot; In place of the ellipses I suggest you add &#039;by confirmation bias&#039;.

In the third paragraph, I don&#039;t think you have fairly presented his argument. He never asks the audience to completely discharge the arguments of scientists. Instead, he asks for skepticism.

Regarding your fourth paragraph, science is very much a human endeavour and does have politics involved in it.  

Evidence must be judged by our faulty brains. For example, Dan Shechtman discovered quasicrystals in 1982 with some pretty solid evidence from electron microscopy. This was quickly followed up by more evidence by many others after their 1984 publication. Linus Pauling, a two time Nobel Laureate and arguably the Master of x-ray crystallography, never believed in quasicrystals because he erroneouly thought they went against a fundamental law of crystallography and they were obviously twinned crystals. Why did he have these misconceptions? Because right up to his death, in 1992, he never bothered to try to understand electron microscopy nor the models of quasicrystals.

In your fifth paragraph, you talk about Ridley&#039;s if-then example. I think that his example could be interpreted as if-then modelling that happens to be skewed by confirmation bias. However, he is not very clear on this point.

The last paragraph is quite confusing, but you did make a clear statement of what you think Ridley&#039;s says. Unfortunately, you provide no evidence of this.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I forgot to mention, in my last reply, that my problems are with the way people are interpreting Ridley&#8217;s arguments.</p>
<p>@Camilla</p>
<p>I see no problem with the first paragraph after your leading sentence, expect that it may be incomplete. For example, it is missing his argument why science progresses: competition.</p>
<p>Your second paragraph, by the way, inappropriately equates the words &#8220;science&#8221; and &#8220;physics&#8221;. </p>
<p>In general, data must be massaged and fitted to models, it is a rare case to have our data clear and distinct.</p>
<p>&#8220;Unless one’s consciousness is pretty much blind…&#8221; In place of the ellipses I suggest you add &#8216;by confirmation bias&#8217;.</p>
<p>In the third paragraph, I don&#8217;t think you have fairly presented his argument. He never asks the audience to completely discharge the arguments of scientists. Instead, he asks for skepticism.</p>
<p>Regarding your fourth paragraph, science is very much a human endeavour and does have politics involved in it.  </p>
<p>Evidence must be judged by our faulty brains. For example, Dan Shechtman discovered quasicrystals in 1982 with some pretty solid evidence from electron microscopy. This was quickly followed up by more evidence by many others after their 1984 publication. Linus Pauling, a two time Nobel Laureate and arguably the Master of x-ray crystallography, never believed in quasicrystals because he erroneouly thought they went against a fundamental law of crystallography and they were obviously twinned crystals. Why did he have these misconceptions? Because right up to his death, in 1992, he never bothered to try to understand electron microscopy nor the models of quasicrystals.</p>
<p>In your fifth paragraph, you talk about Ridley&#8217;s if-then example. I think that his example could be interpreted as if-then modelling that happens to be skewed by confirmation bias. However, he is not very clear on this point.</p>
<p>The last paragraph is quite confusing, but you did make a clear statement of what you think Ridley&#8217;s says. Unfortunately, you provide no evidence of this.</p>
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		<title>By: Massimo</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3123</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Aug 2012 22:52:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3123</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;i&gt;bad data&lt;/i&gt;

Uh ?  Then why not call it &quot;bad data&quot;, instead of &quot;confirmation bias&quot; ? Why not point the readers to &quot;better&quot; data ? And why are data &quot;bad&quot; ? Are the uncertainties incorrect ? And what are the &quot;unjustified adjustments&quot; ?
Come on....]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>bad data</i></p>
<p>Uh ?  Then why not call it &#8220;bad data&#8221;, instead of &#8220;confirmation bias&#8221; ? Why not point the readers to &#8220;better&#8221; data ? And why are data &#8220;bad&#8221; ? Are the uncertainties incorrect ? And what are the &#8220;unjustified adjustments&#8221; ?<br />
Come on&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: confused</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3122</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[confused]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Aug 2012 22:44:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3122</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It has been about a week and I guess I&#039;ll bring up the points I disagree with.

@Doug

I think Ridley is actually saying this particular case of curve fitting (note his use of the word &#039;such&#039;) is an example of confirmation bias because of bad data and &#039;unjustified adjustments&#039;. Ridley even concedes that Muller may be right about CO2 being the best model to his data. Which suggests Ridley doesn&#039;t doubt Muller&#039;s metrics. In essence, Ridley doesn&#039;t like the data processing that goes with the curve fitting in this case.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It has been about a week and I guess I&#8217;ll bring up the points I disagree with.</p>
<p>@Doug</p>
<p>I think Ridley is actually saying this particular case of curve fitting (note his use of the word &#8216;such&#8217;) is an example of confirmation bias because of bad data and &#8216;unjustified adjustments&#8217;. Ridley even concedes that Muller may be right about CO2 being the best model to his data. Which suggests Ridley doesn&#8217;t doubt Muller&#8217;s metrics. In essence, Ridley doesn&#8217;t like the data processing that goes with the curve fitting in this case.</p>
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		<title>By: Massimo</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3108</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2012 18:11:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3108</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Thank you for your comment. I am going to try and reply to the best of my ability, but please let me make it again crystal clear that this is nothing but my own personal opinion.

&lt;i&gt;In Neuroscience and in Cognitive Psychology the interpretations of the data are subjective... They interpret the data in a way that suits their subjective political agenda &lt;/i&gt;

Same in physics or any other experimental science -- no difference whatsoever. 
As long as experimental data are not sufficiently precise, or scarce, or in any case insufficient to rule out some of the competing theories, such theories cannot be discarded. If a long time is needed in order for data to be robust enough, so be it. Case in point, the recent discovery of the Higgs boson. The theory has existed for decades, but the data to accept it as valid were not there until a few months ago -- until then it was just one of the (many) theories consistent with available experimental data. 
&lt;b&gt;Now&lt;/b&gt;, on the other hand, theories that do &lt;i&gt;not&lt;/i&gt; predict the existence of the Higgs boson are on shaky ground.
I think that the only difference with Neurosciences and Cognitive Psychology is that collecting data and statistics is much more difficult, one must make do with limited samples and therefore it becomes more difficult to debunk dubious theories. But, are there &quot;fundamental differences&quot; ? I don&#039;t believe it.

&lt;i&gt;I don&#039;t mean to be condescending&lt;/i&gt;

No worries, if anything I might find you &quot;incomprehensible&quot;. I don&#039;t mean it as an offence, I have never really understood the meaning of questions such as:
&lt;i&gt;What happens to these puzzles when the paradigm shifts again?&lt;/i&gt;
much like I have always found myself at a loss trying to make something, &lt;i&gt;anything&lt;/i&gt; of what individuals like Thomas Kuhn, Ernest Mach or Paul Feyerabend were talking about.
The one thing that has always been obvious to me, is that these people, who made a living out of writing about science, had really little or no direct experience with actual scientific research.

&lt;i&gt;Science is funded by money, those who buy into a paradigm will not put money into experiments outside of that paradigm. &lt;/i&gt;

Even if I accepted the premise (and I don&#039;t, not unless we agree on what &quot;paradigm&quot; means, at least) -- So what ? 
What does that prove, exactly ? Are the individuals funding the research that serves their needs, also capable of making it yield the results that they want ? That there may be a grey area in some cases, where some tentative conclusions are oversold, or where some incorrect beliefs survive longer than they should, sure -- but to say that science as an activity, is intrinsically biased by those who fund is sheer nonsense, I am sorry. 

There are people and corporations that fund research on cold fusion because they are convinced that there may be something to it.  Does that make cold fusion a scientific fact ? Does it mean that they can push onto the pages of Physical Review Letters phoney experimental work supporting the notion of cold fusion, even if no one else can reproduce their results ? Let&#039;s be serious, please.
The tobacco companies poured money into research aimed at disproving claims that cigarette smoke was harmful. Were they successful ? Sure, as long as clinical data were not there. As the evidence started piling up on the deleterious effects of nicotine, the discussion ended. I could give you countless other examples.

That scientific research is largely funded by people with some vested interests is true. What does that say about science itself ? Nothing. There is no &quot;republican&quot;, &quot;democratic&quot;, &quot;communist&quot;, &quot;post-modernist&quot;, &quot;impressionist&quot; science -- there is science, period.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you for your comment. I am going to try and reply to the best of my ability, but please let me make it again crystal clear that this is nothing but my own personal opinion.</p>
<p><i>In Neuroscience and in Cognitive Psychology the interpretations of the data are subjective&#8230; They interpret the data in a way that suits their subjective political agenda </i></p>
<p>Same in physics or any other experimental science &#8212; no difference whatsoever.<br />
As long as experimental data are not sufficiently precise, or scarce, or in any case insufficient to rule out some of the competing theories, such theories cannot be discarded. If a long time is needed in order for data to be robust enough, so be it. Case in point, the recent discovery of the Higgs boson. The theory has existed for decades, but the data to accept it as valid were not there until a few months ago &#8212; until then it was just one of the (many) theories consistent with available experimental data.<br />
<b>Now</b>, on the other hand, theories that do <i>not</i> predict the existence of the Higgs boson are on shaky ground.<br />
I think that the only difference with Neurosciences and Cognitive Psychology is that collecting data and statistics is much more difficult, one must make do with limited samples and therefore it becomes more difficult to debunk dubious theories. But, are there &#8220;fundamental differences&#8221; ? I don&#8217;t believe it.</p>
<p><i>I don&#8217;t mean to be condescending</i></p>
<p>No worries, if anything I might find you &#8220;incomprehensible&#8221;. I don&#8217;t mean it as an offence, I have never really understood the meaning of questions such as:<br />
<i>What happens to these puzzles when the paradigm shifts again?</i><br />
much like I have always found myself at a loss trying to make something, <i>anything</i> of what individuals like Thomas Kuhn, Ernest Mach or Paul Feyerabend were talking about.<br />
The one thing that has always been obvious to me, is that these people, who made a living out of writing about science, had really little or no direct experience with actual scientific research.</p>
<p><i>Science is funded by money, those who buy into a paradigm will not put money into experiments outside of that paradigm. </i></p>
<p>Even if I accepted the premise (and I don&#8217;t, not unless we agree on what &#8220;paradigm&#8221; means, at least) &#8212; So what ?<br />
What does that prove, exactly ? Are the individuals funding the research that serves their needs, also capable of making it yield the results that they want ? That there may be a grey area in some cases, where some tentative conclusions are oversold, or where some incorrect beliefs survive longer than they should, sure &#8212; but to say that science as an activity, is intrinsically biased by those who fund is sheer nonsense, I am sorry. </p>
<p>There are people and corporations that fund research on cold fusion because they are convinced that there may be something to it.  Does that make cold fusion a scientific fact ? Does it mean that they can push onto the pages of Physical Review Letters phoney experimental work supporting the notion of cold fusion, even if no one else can reproduce their results ? Let&#8217;s be serious, please.<br />
The tobacco companies poured money into research aimed at disproving claims that cigarette smoke was harmful. Were they successful ? Sure, as long as clinical data were not there. As the evidence started piling up on the deleterious effects of nicotine, the discussion ended. I could give you countless other examples.</p>
<p>That scientific research is largely funded by people with some vested interests is true. What does that say about science itself ? Nothing. There is no &#8220;republican&#8221;, &#8220;democratic&#8221;, &#8220;communist&#8221;, &#8220;post-modernist&#8221;, &#8220;impressionist&#8221; science &#8212; there is science, period.</p>
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		<title>By: Douglas Natelson</title>
		<link>http://expbook.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/on-confirmation-bias/#comment-3106</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Douglas Natelson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2012 04:00:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://expbook.wordpress.com/?p=8626#comment-3106</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Nice post, Massimo - you did a much more thorough job than I did.  To be clear, Confused, Ridley seems to have a very weird (one might say biased) concept of confirmation bias.  He seems to think that the very act of comparing data to a set of models and declaring that one is the best fit is inherently biased, because the person doing the comparing selected the models.  That&#039;s just incorrect.  It is possible to make quantitative comparisons with models in an objective way.  It is possible to ascribe &quot;goodness of fit&quot; metrics, and to compare these quantitatively, in an objective way.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nice post, Massimo &#8211; you did a much more thorough job than I did.  To be clear, Confused, Ridley seems to have a very weird (one might say biased) concept of confirmation bias.  He seems to think that the very act of comparing data to a set of models and declaring that one is the best fit is inherently biased, because the person doing the comparing selected the models.  That&#8217;s just incorrect.  It is possible to make quantitative comparisons with models in an objective way.  It is possible to ascribe &#8220;goodness of fit&#8221; metrics, and to compare these quantitatively, in an objective way.</p>
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